Sweet32 (CVE-2016-2183)
A recent scan from TrustWave is listing this vulnerability.
Details: This is a cipher vulnerability, not limited to any specific SSL/TLS software implementation. DES and Tripple DES (3DES) block ciphers with a block size of 64 bits, have a birthday bound of approximately 4 billion blocks (or 2 to the power of 32, hence the name of this vulnerability). A man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker, who is able to capture a large amount of encrypted network traffic, can recover sensitive plain text data.
Remediation: This issue can by avoided by disabling block ciphers of 64 bit length (like DES/3DES) in all the SSL/TLS servers. Exact procedure depends on the actual implementation. Please refer to the documentation of your SSL/TLS server software.
Can anyone confirm that the Apache SSL Cipher Suite should change from:
ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:!DSS
To: ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:!DSS
I wasn't sure if all DES-CBC3 ciphers should be removed or just the last one in the list.
To: ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:!DSS
I wasn't sure if all DES-CBC3 ciphers should be removed or just the last one in the list.
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Hello, The report from Trustwave does suggest removing all DES and 3DES-related ciphers, so your example is correct if that's what they require for compliance. You can read the OpenSSL article about this specific vulnerability on their website at: The SWEET32 Issue, CVE-2016-2183 - OpenSSL Blog There are some comments under the article regarding Trustwave that you may want to review. Thank you. 0 -
Hello guys. I was about to ask the same question, cause removing all DES and 3DES-related ciphers will match the default config of ciphers proposed by cPanel. My question is... what browsers would become unable to open secured sites if those ciphers are removed? 0 -
My question is... what browsers would become unable to open secured sites if those ciphers are removed?
Hello @Kent Brockman, There might be other examples of browsers using 3DES on end-of-life operating systems, however from what I've read this is only going to affect Windows XP users with IE6 or IE8. Thank you.0
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